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Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup
and Inner City Jobs: Indiana's
Urban In-fill Incentives
James T. O'Reillyt
In the last two decades, manufacturers have moved away from the inner
city, taking valuable job opportunities and leaving behind environmentally
hazardous sites. These sites are expensive to clean up when abandoned, and
the lenders may be held liable as a last resort. This situation has created a
large disincentive for remediating these sites, preventing poor inner-city
communities from realizing meaningful economic opportunities. Mr. O'Reilly
contends that current federal remediation procedures fraught with uncertainty
and high cost are the primary cause of this barrier to inner-city economic
rejuvenation. In a "report from the field," Mr. O'Reilly examines Indiana's
most recent effort to overcome this barrier and facilitate inner-city site cleanup.
This unique Indiana program allows developers and manufacturers, through
voluntary remediation agreements, to clean up potentially productive inner-city
sites without the specter of liability. Mr. O'Reilly concludes that Indiana's
program is necessary for renewed inner-city job growth and should serve as
a model for the rest of the country.
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Introduction
This nation's siting policy for environmentally hazardous facilities has long
targeted the areas inhabited by poor and usually minority residents. Government
and private waste haulers have chosen these neighborhoods because of the low
cost and the communities' perceived political weakness. Recent thoughtful
essays have challenged this "environmental racism" and have correlated health
effects with lower economic status.' Policy makers have begun to realize that
racial and economic disadvantage have been exacerbated by decades of.
I. It has been suggested that the disparate impact of environmental pollution on communities of color
has also adversely affected the residents' health status. Unfortunately, this effect has not yet been quantified
thoroughly, though there is much anecdotal evidence to support this assertion. See Marianne Lavelle, An
Industrial Legacy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S3 (discussing health impact of pollution on the African-
American community in Chicago's South Side).
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insensitive siting and zoning choices.' There is, however, another problem
besetting these communities, a problem less racially motivated on its face, but
no less injurious in its effect.
3
In this country, polluted sites are geographically distributed near the
residences of the disadvantaged members of society; consequently the
disadvantaged bear the brunt of the detrimental economic and health
consequences of past environmental neglect.4 These sites are polluted not
merely because of dumping, but because of previous, economically beneficial
manufacturing activity that has since left the inner city. These sites sit empty
today because of the enormous expense of remediating a "dirty" site.
This Article posits that current environmental remediation (cleanup) policy
has produced this no-win situation; the failure of these remediation policies has
thus become a barrier to the advancement of the inner-city resident. Costly
environmental cleanup procedures and fears of belated liability encouraged
many banks to adopt environmentally selective commercial lending policies.5
Fear of liability encourages banks to withhold loans and opportunities for
business development in inner cities. While such banking decisions may be
justified as economically efficient, their consequences are equally pernicious
to inner city communities as are the more traditional forms of environmental
racism allegedly occurring in siting decisions.
Several studies have principally focused on alleviating the adverse effects
on lower income communities caused by the dumping of society's waste;6 this
Article, however, does not address this problem. What must be addressed are
the cumulative results of previous hazardous industrial processes and the
barriers to cleaning up the sites where such activity took place. Cleaning these
otherwise productive sites, however, is often prohibitively expensive. As a
result, the less powerful communities are prevented from realizing meaningful
economic opportunities.7 Moreover, the long list of sites awaiting waste site
2. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY-REDUCING RISK
FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,.SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING
COMMUNITIES (1983). Environmental racism has been categorized as a "newly recognized form of racial
discrimination." Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 394
(1991). Religious groups first gave attention to this phenomenon. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle,
Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at SI, S4.
3. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 2, at S I.
4. "People of color are much more likely to have hazardous waste sites in their backyards than are
whites." John Heritage, Environmental Protection-Has it Been Fair?, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992 (letter from
the editor).
5. See, e.g., Dennis Melamed, Courts: Lenders Must Pay Cleanup, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June
25, 1990, at 9.
6. Lavelle, supra note I (discussing assertions that illness rates among persons in Chicago
neighborhoods hosting waste facilities exceed those in other areas).
7. See, e.g., Edward Patrick Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism,
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 937 (1993); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); Naikang Tsao, Note, Ameliorating Environmental
45
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cleanup priority under the federal law8 seems to have delayed the amelioration
of health problems in poorer communities. 9 Any solution to this unfairness
must be creative and empowering.' ° It must stinmulate the creation of new job
opportunities, bringing higher wage jobs to inner-city residents through
environmental policy shifts. Creative change can nurture job opportunity in
those disadvantaged areas where today few private sector manufacturing jobs
are available for the current residents.
This Article addresses one possible solution to this problem of "almost
environmental racism": the Indiana Urban In-fill Incentive Program. Indiana,
by offering prospective developers a shield from liability if they carry out a
supervised cleanup of a site, eases the worries of lenders and other sources of
necessary capital. As a result, development and job growth essential for the
inner city is made possible. Part I begins with a discussion of current federal
environmental regulation and how it acts as a barrier to the redevelopment of
polluted inner-city sites, focusing on the problem of lender liability under these
regulations. Part i analyzes Indiana's recent experiment with environmental
remediation procedures and these procedures' potential for mitigating lender
liability for environmental cleanup. I conclude that, with the additional state
support of inner-city cleanup and redevelopment described in Part III,
implementation of Indiana-like plans across the nation can be an important part
of resuscitating our cities.
I. The Current Situation
A. The Value of an Inner-city Manufacturing Base
The best private sector wages in our economy available to non-college
graduates are typically found in manufacturing positions." The route to
success for the less-skilled person has traditionally been a manufacturing job
with a well-understood path of progression to the middle class. A person
capable of performing semi-skilled tasks such as assembly and casting can
develop a work ethic that will enable that individual to advance and ultimately
Racism: A Citizens' Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 366 (1992); Godsil, Note, supra note 2, at 394 (1991): Luke W. Cole, Correspondence, Remedies for
Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992); Stephen C. Jones, EPA
Targets 'Environmental Racism', NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 28.
8. Section 9605 of Title 42 of the United States Code authorizes the listing process, which has slowly
grown to more than a thousand sites that may be subjected to cleanup under CERCLA. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,840
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). By 1989, the listing process alone had taken 43 months. See
generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 363-68
(1992).
9. Lavelle, supra note 1.
10. Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10.
11. Manufacturing wages and hours worked consistently exceed those of the service sector. U.S. DEP'T.
OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS STATISTICS, 1963-1991, at 51 (1993).
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represent a productivity gain for an employer. A worker can earn higher wage
positions within a manufacturing facility (quality control inspector, team leader,
foreman, and ultimately manager) after developing a successful work record.
These positions are not only valuable to the individual, but have a multiplier
effect: they are the building blocks upon which all other professions in an
economy gain an opportunity to provide services to the wage earners. Although
total manufacturing jobs have declined, 12 their continuing availability in the
inner city sustains higher income opportunities for working people and the sur-
rounding community.
American urban history depicts waves of European immigrants in urban
coastal cities climbing the social ladder by obtaining the higher-paying
manufacturing jobs that urban core industrial sites offered. Persons of color
came to Northern industrial settings in search of the same ladder of success,
and some found the jobs that rural America did not offer. Hundreds of
thousands of brick and concrete buildings in inner cities are memorials to this
hope. With the buildings, manufacturing brought opportunities to community
residents-these sites where the workers' labor created goods for export, for
both the war effort during several conflicts and for the startup entrepreneurs
who built small garages into larger and larger facilities. Carnegie Libraries
would not exist without steel workers, nor would the Ford Foundation without
auto assemblers, nor television networks without armies of vacuum tube
assemblers in the radio and early television factories of urban America.
Steady attendance, solid performance, willingness to work and incentives
to produce are the desired attributes of a manufacturing work force. Inner-city
workers can offer all of these. Highway access, well developed infrastructure,
power and water lines, easy access to rail tracks and to other modes of transport
are all desirable features of existing city sites. In past decades, these features
encouraged the active recycling of older, abandoned business sites.13
The sites and the buildings remain, but the recycling has stopped.
Manufacturing jobs have not stayed in the inner city. The social isolation of
city neighborhoods, cited by critics of environmental racism, deepened as
neighborhood jobs departed. The disconnection of inner-city residents from
these relocated sites was amplified by underfunded urban transportation
systems. Mass transit is less adaptable for use in more remote sites.'
4
12. David R. Howell & Edward N. Wolff, Trends in the Growth and Distribution of Skills in the U.S.
Workplace, 1960-1985, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 486 (1991).
13. See JOHN BLAIR, INDUSTRIAL POLARIZATION AND THE LOCATION OF NEW MANUFACTURING FIRMS:
AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION (1976).
14. Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Effect of Job Access on Black and White Youth
Employment: A Cross-SectionalAnalysis, 28 J. URB. STUD. 255 (1991 ). Access to mass transit is particularly
important in job decline and replacement trends. See Samuel H. Ehrenhalt, Some Perspectives on the New
York Economy in a Time of Change, in NEW YORK CITY'S CHANGING ECONOMIC BASE 18 (Benjamin J.
Klebaner ed., 198 1).
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Manufacturing shift workers and those who want overtime incentive pay find
it difficult to use public transportation to get to distant sites at unusual hours.
The price of automobile transportation increased very significantly during the
1970s and 1980s, outpacing the income growth for the manufacturing
worker. 15 Insurance and fuel expenses, as well as the number of vehicles, are
likely to increase further in the 1990s. Therefore inner-city residents are less
likely to be able to travel out to distant job sites via personal automobiles.16
Municipal and urban school budgets lost revenues from manufacturing
facility taxes as plants moved. Taxes increased on inner-city real property held
by the remaining local manufacturers. In the suburbs and outlying counties,
taxes became relatively lower, creating another incentive for manufacturers to
leave the city to buy fields untouched by past development. 7 As municipal
revenues declined, so did city services such as transportation. Urban school
systems' funding for job training, adult education, and vocational education
suffered from declining budgets and were not sufficiently enhanced by federal
funds to make up the shortfall. 8 The restoration of hope for inner-city
residents is difficult, but certainly achievable, if the opportunities for local jobs
can be restored.
Why have willing workers in inner-city urban areas not benefitted from
ready sites available in their neighborhood? Why has there been so little of the
past turnover, re-use, and infill of new construction between the existing inner-
city industrial sites? Environmental barriers to economic rehabilitation of inner-
city industry have played a large role in squashing these opportunities. Unless
change occurs, the hope for high-value, high-reward jobs as a vehicle for
advancement among inner-city residents is doomed.'9
15. The average number of weeks of median family income needed to equal an average new car
expenditure rose from 18.7 weeks of income in 1970 to 24.5 weeks in 1990. The average annual costs of
owning a car rose from $1,831 in 1975 to $4,100 in 1990, and the average new car purchase price rose from
$3,542 in 1970 to $16,012 in 1990. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1992, at 613 (1993).
16. Of course, workers who commute by single-occupant vehicles, as opposed to the short bus or
subway ride of the past, increase net environmental pollution for a metropolitan area. In order to reduce
net pollution of cities from passenger car use, mandates or incentives for reducing single-passenger vehicle
trips will be imposed as part of transportation control plans resulting from 1990 amendments to the federal
Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(f)(2), 104 Stat. 2410 (1990).
17. Urban development officials confront the problem of tax rate differences as an additional
disincentive to urban location and relocation. See THE RETENTION AND EXPANSION OF EXISTING BUSINESSES
(George W. Morse ed., 1990).
18. Federal aid for job training in school district budgets declined from $1.26 billion in 1988 to $1.038
billion in 1991. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at 282.
19. Fewer manufacturing jobs will be available, but workers holding those jobs will have greater
responsibility and must have higher skill and more technical knowledge. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TOWARD A NEW ERA IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 7 (1986); see also William Sander & Peter V. Schaeffer,
Schooling and Urban Employment Growth, 43 J. ECON. & Bus. 69 (1991).
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B. The Cost and Uncertainty of Federal Law
Today's environmental cleanup programs were intended to expedite the
cleanup process and prepare sites for redevelopment. Instead, these programs
are fraught with uncertainties that erect barriers to recycling manufacturing sites
in the inner city. This Article posits that the cost and uncertainty inherent in
environmental cleanup procedures have contributed to the decline of urban
industrial manufacturing facilities as active employers in the inner city. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), ° and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, also
known as "Superfund")2" are the principal federal statutes relating to the
remediation of past contamination at industrial sites. State legislatures have
adopted their own versions of the cleanup legislation to complement the federal
requirements.22 Each of the laws aims to restore sites to "clean" status through
requirements for remediation. These laws, however, are terribly unclear on
many issues-including how clean an industrial facility must become, at what
remedial cost, and within what period-and lead to nothing more than delay.
1. RCRA
If activity such as manufacturing or warehousing is underway at a site,
discovery of past contamination problems on the property need not foreclose
continued use of the site while cleanup occurs. Active sites are cleaned up
under the supervision of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or
states acting under the authority of RCRA" RCRA focuses on active sites
and their gradual restoration to the level of soil, water, or air conditions found
in the "background levels" of that local area.' A typical example is a factory,
still in operation, that finds petroleum distillates on its site during a routine
EPA inspection. This site would be issued RCRA corrective action orders
which command the operator to dig up the storage yard and remove subsurface
contaminants. 2 - The private operator or owner of the site conducts the cleanup
to a level of "clean" soil-for instance, only the slight residual presence of
undesired chemicals-that is acceptable to the EPA and the state environmental
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
21. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
22. Because creation of parallel state programs is a prerequisite to state implementation of hazardous
waste site licensing under RCRA, the majority of states have adopted such laws. Id. § 6929.
23. Id. § 6924(u).
24. Because modem analytical chemistry is capable of detecting small amounts of virtually every
contaminant on a site, environmental cleanup plans examine the nearby soil as a background and compare
it to the soil of the site where the spill or other contamination occurred.
25. 40 C.F.R. § 264.101 (1992) (authorizing corrective action orders).
The Yale Journal on Regulation
agencies.26 In some cases, continued industrial operations render a site an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health. If so, the EPA usually brings
court actions to force rapid removal of wastes in order to reduce the public
threat created by contamination of groundwater, air, or other resources.27
Delay and details of a RCRA cleanup are so cumbersome,28 and the law's
requirements so complex and detailed, that few participants can understand and
avoid liability under the regulations. 29 The definition of "hazardous waste"
alone is an indecipherable mess.30 Criminal and civil penalties make RCRA
a veritable minefield for the novice facility owner and attorney."
2. CERCLA
In addition to the many active sites where past spills or releases have
occurred over years or decades, there are thousands of inactive sites. Those sites
which no longer have active manufacturing, solvent collection, or production
are considered to be abandoned. At a typical inactive property (often forfeited
for nonpayment of property tax), CERCLA cleanup can be performed with
federal money. The central element of CERCLA is the Superfund, a source of
special cleanup funds that can be used by the EPA.32 The Superfund is the
financing mechanism for the environmental cleanup of the abandoned sites.33
Federal dollars are used only if the private sector's "potentially responsible
parties" are not available to pay, or decline to pay. If a potentially responsible
party is known or can be found, however, that party can be held jointly and
26. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988). Unlike the voluntary programs described later in this Article, under
RCRA, the standard of clean is determined by the enforcement agency whose work plans set levels for
removal of wastes and contaminants through site specific determinations.
27. Imminent hazard contamination cases are challenged through court ordered remediation actions.
42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988); see United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982);
see also Joel Mintz, Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites and the RCRA Imminent Hazard Provisions, II
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 247 (1987).
28. At a recent regional seminar on environmental business issues, an expert consulting firm presented
with pride its success story of taking a client's active site from the start of the RCRA process to a stage
of in'estigation, in only seven years. The estimate for completion of the entire process was ten to fifteen
years. The consultant duly advised the attendees that by searching for waste conditions on site, they
increased their responsibility for reporting, planning, and cleanup. James Determann, Address at the
Manufacturers Environmental Symposium (Mar. I1, 1993).
29. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261-264 (1992).
30. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 241 (explaining 40 C.F.R. § 261).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972-73 (1988); see also ROBERT E. STEINBERG & ROBIN K. WEINER, RCRA
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (1993).
32. 57 Fed. Reg. 34,742 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300,308) (proposing rule on computing
cleanup costs later assessed against potentially responsible parties).
33. RICHARD H. MAYS, CERCLA LITIGATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE § 12.03 (1993).
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severally liable for the cleanup expenses, 34 with reimbursements paid later to
the Superfund.35
CERCLA requires that the governmental agency, usually the EPA, consider
a site's past uses, the current state of its groundwater, surface water, and soil,
for example, and determine whether to list the particular site for a future
cleanup.36 Even if listed on the National Priority List,37 the particular site's
federal cleanup is likely to occur only after higher-priority sites have been
completed, a sequence which may take years or decades. In the interim,
emergency measures might be taken to remove the most hazardous materials
from the site.38 More typically, however, the site will remain unremediated
for years as private companies responsible for the contamination negotiate with
the EPA on a privately-funded remediation. Negotiated CERCLA settlements
are lengthy processes with great complexity for the multiple parties involved.39
For example, an Indiana site, the former Seymour Recycling Company,
consumed millions of dollars and took years to remediate a toxic waste
contamination problem."
The CERCLA system of abandoned site remediation began as a massive
financial reallocation scheme premised on retroactive redefinition of each firm's
past waste deposits at the site. CERCLA helped government officials trace the
contributors for a site, and then allocated the costs of selecting and
implementing a remedy.' Costs can often be considerable." The system has
evolved to the point today that private responsible parties, rather than the
government, expend the major effort to obtain payment of shares of the total
cleanup expenses from each contributor, disposer, or person who arranged for
disposal. 3 CERCLA attempts the reallocation of those costs to private sector
entities which had themselves, or through predecessor entities, deposited wastes
at the now-abandoned sites."
Delay is so widely recognized as a flaw of these remedial programs that
advocates of inner-city rehabilitation are likely to be skeptical when told that
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Outlook Good for Regional Implementation of Administrative Fixes Package, Staff
Says, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 510, 511 (July 23, 1993) (stating that fewer cleanups began in 1992-93 because
of low Superfund resources).
36. MAYS, supra note 33, § 7.07.
37. In 1993, of 30,000 suspect sites in the data base, 1500 were on this list. Id. intro. at 5.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
39. MAYS, supra note 33, § 5.19.
40. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir.
1985).
42. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (involving $5,800,000 reimbursement
settlement to clean up pig farm used as waste disposal site).
43. MAYS, supra note 33, § 7.07; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 8,
at 209.
44. Andrew H. Perellis & Mary E. Doohan, Superfund Litigation: The Elements and Scope of Liability,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1, 14 (Janet S. Kole & Larry 0. Espel eds., 1991).
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waiting for cleanup under government mandates will suffice. The tremendous
financial effort expended on CERCLA has produced relatively few clean sites,
a fact much criticized in Congress.45 Action funded by private capital with
government approval serves as an alternative to the endless waiting that
accompanies a government cleanup. Unfortunately, CERCLA has created a third
alternative, placing lenders whose past borrowers had defaulted in the role of
a deep pocket for the cleanup costs.
46
3. Effects of Federal Law
Unfortunately, well-intended federal remediation legislation has not led to
efficient cleanup of inner-city sites. Instead, RCRA and CERCLA have infused
the cleanup process with uncertainty and high cost in several ways. First, a site
owner who looks for soil contaminants will probably find some detectable level
of lead or other airborne contaminants. How much greater the contaminant
levels are, compared to background levels, is difficult to determine. Discovery
of soil contamination could compel mandatory notification to the government,
and the law gives government the incentive to react harshly. 47 Second, owners
cannot make reliable estimates of site cleanup costs. That uncertainty arises
because the federal programs based on CERCLA4' and RCRA 49 are arcane
and still-evolving corrective action programs. Third, and most important for
the purposes of this Article, these unsettled issues of who must pay for cleanup
have frightened lending institutions, the traditional sources of capital for factory
rehabilitation and renovation for startup companies.5' This fear was inevitable,
since lenders' liability for cleanup costs is unclear in the statutes and is still
debated extensively in the courts.52
45. See, e.g., Subcommittee Threatens to Withhold Funding Without Financial Management
Improvements, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 550 (July 30, 1993).
46. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). The EPA's rule sets forth a
security interest exemption from liability for lenders whose indicia of ownership are held primarily to protect
a security interest, provided that they do not participate in management of the facility. Although some courts
have absolved lenders of liability because they did not have overall decision making powers over a facility,
these courts have left much room under the rule for lenders to be liable. See, e.g., Waterville Indus. v.
Finance Auth. of Maine, 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993); Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich.
1993); see also Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
47. An industrial site with a RCRA generator permit has a continuing obligation to notify federal
officials of discovery of hazardous chemicals at sites covered by the permit. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(a)(6),
6924(u) (1988).
48. Id. §§ 9601-9675.
49. Id. §§ 6901-6992.
50. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 264.101 (1992).
51. See Patricia R. Healy & John J. Healy, Jr., Lenders' Perspectives on Environmental Issues, 60
APPRAISAL J. 394 (1992).
52. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cit. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 752
(1991); see also William R. Mitchell, CERCLA: The Problem of Lender Liability, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 101 (1991); Philip J. Schworer & Catherine M. White, Environmental Problems and Their Effect on
Lending Institutions, 18 N. Ky. L. REV. 175 (1991); Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors:
Vol. 11: 43, 1994
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C. Lender Liability and Greenlining
This nascent environmental awareness among those who controlled the
funding for industrial expansion and relocation altered the historical pattern for
inner-city business development. 3 Traditionally, an expanding urban manu-
facturing company could grow most easily by adding space within the same
neighborhood, and would get a loan to finance the expansion. As the market
price of inner-city industrial properties declined in the 1970s and 1980s, the
savings generated by their re-use should have attracted entrepreneurs who
needed access to low cost buildings, willing workers, and an established
infrastructure.54 However, bank lending officers and their superiors learned with
regret that lenders could be held liable for environmental cleanup costs as
owners of past industrial sites.:" Past practices of back-door ditch disposal and
side-yard rusty drum storage cast a liability shadow on the solid, still
serviceable urban properties. Banks, as well as particular bankers, feared the
failure of the new tenant, not only for the usual economic reasons, but also
because of the risk of environmental challenges to the defaulted site's lender .
6
This shroud of uncertainty created by past environmental practices made the
prospective site users virtually unable to obtain financing.
Certainly, one cannot say that all older urban manufacturing sites have
environmental pollution problems or that the environmental issue alone retards
bank credit for urban site salvaging. The slow recession in the latter half of the
1980s worsened the plight of many financial institutions, affecting investment
decisions about real property development.57 Failures of industrial manu-
facturers, relative to the performance of their foreign competitors, reflected an
increasingly cost-driven global marketplace which pressed hard against
American manufacturers' profit margins. Yet it is clear that uncertainty about
the costs of past urban environmental harms contributed significantly to these
failures by inhibiting bank investment in existing inner-city industrial areas. s"
Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1991).
53. Healy & Healy, supra note 51, at 396-97; Turning Green-With Worry, ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990,
at 84 [hereinafter Turning Greenl. This fear of environmental losses came at a time when the number of
banks with "problem" status rose from 217 in 1980 to 1,575 in 1987 and remained at 1,069 by 1991, with
more than one-quarter of the problem banks located in the heavily industrial Northeastern region. U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, supra note 15, at.496, 498.
54. Ehrenhalt, supra note 14, at 6, 18.
55. Turning Green, supra note 53: Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
56. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550; United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); see also Superfund Lender Liability Explored During Senate Hearing,
PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, July 25, 1990, at 19.
57. Indices of bank stability dropped sharply in the late 1980s. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra
note 15, at 496, 498.
58. Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
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A recent study in New Jersey, one of the few examinations of these
conditions,59 confirms that a climate of fear and uncertainty among lenders
may have deterred site rehabilitation." In a banking survey, more than seventy
percent of banks that made loans secured by real property insisted upon
environmental site evaluations.61 Bankers became skittish and their small
business clients became potentially vulnerable to lender reluctance because of
environmental factors. For example, a machine shop wanted to move to a larger
facility in order to compete for an aircraft manufacturing subcontract but found
that banks were less likely to loan money for a new urban site where a plastics
processor had been fabricating plastic bottles and might have improperly
handled its waste chemicals.62
This economic uncertainty stemmed from the legal system's uncertainty
about how to deal with the residues from past environmental practices.
Development of the sites and their potential to create jobs for local residents
were hampered by doubt that past environmental effects could be overcome,
in a timely and reasonably predictable way, so as to reassure lenders. This
Article contends that this doubt is a direct result of ineffective federal
remediation procedures. The confusion is especially severe because particular
industrial properties, like factories with storage tanks, had been given no clear
standards by environmental regulators.63 The development of Superfund case
law during the 1980s identified new risks and problems for the lender,
especially joint and several liability.6 Regulatory agency pronouncements
about CERCLA were somewhat reassuring, but did not offer easy and
predictable solutions.65 Unfunded contingent liabilities for such environmental
cleanups became a threat to a banker's individual career, as well as to a bank's
stability.66
As a result, lenders decided to exclude older industrial properties from their
portfolio of expansion and relocation loans. Just as "redlining" selected out the
racially transitional neighborhoods in the 1970s, "greenlining" has selected out
those environmentally risky areas where lenders will no longer tread.67
59. See Michael Greenberg et al., TOADS Go to New Jersey: Implications for Land Use and Public
Health in Mid-Sized and Large U.S. Cities, 29 J. URB. STUD. 117 (1992).
60. Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
61. Healy & Healy, supra note 51, at 396.
62. Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
63. Brooks J. Bowen, Liability for LUSTS: An Exercise in Confusion, 83 AM. BANKERS ASS'N J. 28
(1991).
64. See United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); MAYS, supra note 33, § 7.07.
65. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992); EPA rule vacated and remanded, Kelly v. EPA, No. 92-1312, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 1715 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 1994).
66. See, e.g., Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
67. Greenlining is analogous to redlining, the racially discriminatory practice of denying loans to home
purchasers in certain residential neighborhoods. For a discussion of redlining, see Conference of Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Sociologists and economists can debate the wisdom of banks' collective
decisions to greenline environmentally risky-and usually, minority-areas, but
the debate is futile. Financial institutions will continue to communicate to real
estate interests the message that this economic and environmental uncertainty
makes it commercially infeasible to offer loans for new occupants of these
inner-city sites.68 Greenlined inner-city industrial sites and the communities
they used to support are, as a result, unable to transform into vibrant manu-
facturing locations as they did during past changes of occupancy.
D. The Response of Developers: Flight
The would-be industrial employer desires an available site, near customers,
upon which a facility can be rapidly constructed, staffed, and equipped. Urban
sites can be ideal, but the slow and encumbered federal site remediation process
offers a poor response to these needs of a competitive employer.
The expense and delay of an environmental site remediation deters
beneficial use of the industrial sites formerly inhabited by prior generations of
employers. The pragmatic developer fears that by the time an environmental
agency can become satisfied that no further RCRA and CERCLA remediation
duties exist for an industrial location, the manufacturer will no longer sustain
interest in that manufacturing site.
There are also inherent disincentives to taking risks with potentially tainted
sites: criminal action for violating the complex waste laws69 and legal costs
for hasty or incorrect action.7 ° These potential drawbacks make the option of
site cleanup a high risk activity for the entrepreneur. A legal assurance of non-
liability has been impossible to obtain. And, as discussed in the previous
section, these developers face a lack of available credit because federal
environmental law places lenders in a precarious position.
Manufacturing employers, confronting these facts, have moved to the
virgin farmland of rural and suburban communities. 7 Lack of credit
availability to rehabilitate the inner-city site has deterred the manufacturing
employer from doing a local, short-distance relocation into a larger building
while retaining its existing cohort of workers. Environmentally risk-averse
financing officers have recommended flight onto virgin land in a distant suburb,
resulting in job losses for urban communities. Photos on the lobby walls of the
new plants show the once-busy, solid brick building of the old site with a
neighborhood surrounding it. The old plants, visible from the elevated subways
of Boston, Chicago, New York, and from the elevated highways of dozens of
68. See Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)-(f) (1988).
70. See generally MAYS, supra note 33; STEINBERG & WEINER, sulira note 3 1.
71. William Tucker, Superfund Sparkl Industrial Flight, INSIGHT, Nov. 29, 1993, at 7.
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other inner cities, are wraiths of inner-city industry that no longer resemble the
nostalgic photographs.
Flight of capital and jobs was not a collective choice premised upon
environmental racism, so much as it was a response to environmental
uncertainty. Uncertain standards and norms of environmental protection,
imposed on industrial site owners and lenders, encouraged flight to virgin
properties outside the cities, thereby deepening the inner-city resident's
isolation. But each departure widened social separation and placed the less
affluent entry-level worker at a severe disadvantage. An employer's quest for
financially viable, environmentally pristine sites usually meant a loss of inner-
city employment,72 as well as a diminution of the rural ecosystem. Federal
cleanup mechanisms have not adequately addressed the need for industrial job
opportunities in the inner city. Virgin farmland will continue to be converted
to industrial use, while the inner-city site's environmental problems sit idly, as
do inner-city residents, awaiting a system that works for both environment and
employment.
II. Indiana's New Remediation Program
The inner-city job displacement problem that mirrors the environmental
racism problem has damaging consequences for poor, minority communities
in the inner city. The federal cleanup command system, a litigation-centered
process, imposes both cost and uncertainty that exacerbate the displacement
problem. In light of this uncertainty and risk, there needs to be a means by
which urban jobs can be preserved or created while we improve the
environmental condition of urban areas. Responsiveness to markets, urban
resident workers, and environmental needs should be deemed compatible.
Though greenlining and developer uncertainty are just two of many barriers to
inner-city residents' employment in higher wage positions, the means to remove
this barrier are at hand.73
Indiana recently established a program meeting these important criteria.
The program features a voluntary, less bureaucratic mechanism for inner-city
site remediation.74 Indiana's voluntary cleanup program has great logical
appeal and offers inner-city workers something they have not had for a long
72. Urban core areas have a decreased share of new plant activity and a decline in business activity
in existing plants. See BLAIR, supra note 13. Cost is a significant element in job movement out of core areas.
See Keith R. lhlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Role of Space in Determining the Occupations of Black
and White Workers, 21 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 295 (1991); James Cook, Exodus, FORBES, Sept. 16,
1991, at 56.
73. Additional barriers include education and skill deficiencies that may be attributed to urban school
inadequacies. See Howell & Wolff, supra note 12, at 486 see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 19, at 65. It is possible that enhanced tax bases may improve revenue streams for urban schools.
74. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9 (Bums Supp. 1993).
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time-hope. The Indiana program increases certainty and lowers cost. A
voluntary agreement between the government and the developer introduces
certainty into the siting system. This agreement ensures that a prospective
cleanup will have a defined objective and a finite goal, while maintaining
government supervision as well as public accountability. Lenders are reassured
that the site passes government standards and can be used profitably. The
economic stimulus of profitable land salvaging is harnessed, preserving urban
employment. Smarter, faster use of environmental remediation agreements slows
or reverses the exodus of high-value, high-wage jobs to the suburbs or other
countries.
A. Creation
Indiana built its program on the experiences of a few other states75 but
carried its programs further with respect to post-cleanup exoneration, employing
a governor's covenant not to sue. Formulating the specific terms of Indiana's
voluntary plan to satisfy all of the relevant parties was a critical task. The
process in Indiana began with preliminary meetings among representatives of
environmental groups, business interests, and financial interests. These meetings
revealed a common goal in the voluntary cleanup program.76 The group then
prepared a legislative package. Senator Simpson sponsored the legislation,
which the Indiana legislature passed overwhelmingly in 1992.77
Other states interested in instituting a voluntary remediation program.
should be aware that the strength of this process will have a determinative
effect on the outcome.78 Participants in Indiana found that the process of
preliminary meetings worked well. "It's best to find the needs of each group
up front. Absent that, we'd find ourselves doing battle after the fact."7 9 All
the participants in the discussions understood the cost issues. "In these days of
much competition and demand for limited capital, we are all looking for other
approaches that can provide more bang for the buck, and the voluntary program
won support because it made actual cleanup of sites more likely to occur."80
The interaction of the planning process resulted in positive coverage by the
press and support from the environmental and industrial communities.
75. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.614 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 465.285 (1991).
76. Telephone Interview with Greta Hawvermale, Indiana Department of Environmental Management
(Sept. 14, 1993) [hereinafter Hawvermale].
77. 1992 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 87-1992 (S.E.A. 392) (West).
78. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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According to state officials; lenders' willingness to fund the rehabilitation
of property was a major impetus behind the Indiana program." Inner-city
locations were a primary focus of early discussions about the law.82 The new
law provided the stimulus of inspiring voluntary self-examination of property,
replacing the former "out of sight, out of mind" approach.83 Those involved
in formulating this unique legislation, however, recognized the need for future
improvements in the law. According to some business commentators, these
improvements would have to include specific definitions of the level of cleanup
that would be acceptable under the program."
B. Fruition
1. The Covenant Not to Sue
Indiana's program for the voluntary remediation of sites became effective
in July 1993, and it squarely addresses the problem of certainty concerning a
polluted site's environmental status.8- No property owner is forced to
participate. If the owner cooperates in a voluntary program, the state can
supervise the cleanup of the site and then declare the property environmentally
acceptable. The Governor of Indiana will then personally sign a covenant not
to sue the entity for the disclosed environmental conditions that have been
remediated.86
This covenant is the linchpin of Indiana's remediation program. In our
litigious society there are few assurances that a business deal will not be subject
to a lawsuit. Indiana's system seeks certainty by offering such an assurance.
The governor's signed covenant not to sue the property's developer will bar
both state and private suits under Indiana's hazardous waste laws.87 A state
governor's covenant not to sue is a prize that is not awarded lightly.
Many readers will likely flag a potential problem: states cannot prevent
federal authorities from bringing suit against owners of polluted sites. Although
the state cannot stop federal agencies from acting, the holder of a state covenant
91. Alan Julian, Businesses Can Come Clean ... For Free, EVANSVILLE COURIER, May 18, 1993, at
C6.
82. Businesses Concerned About State's New Environmental Program, PRINCETON (Indiana) DAILY
CLARION, June 9, 1993, at C2.
83. Laura Paul-Hatcher, Program Invites Cleanups, GARY POST-TRIBUNE, June 18, 1993, at C6.
84. Businesses Concerned About State's New Environmental Program, supra note 82, at C2. Ohio
addressed this issue when it considered its own versiop of the Indiana program, requiring state officials to
create "separate numerical standards based upon the intended use of properties after the completion of
voluntary actions" so that the level of cleanup would be more closely defined earlier in the process of
voluntary remediation negotiations. S.B. 221, 120th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. (1993).
85. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9 (Bums Supp. 1993).
86. Id. § 13-7-8.9-18.
87. Id. The statute also protects the successful applicant against actions under state law by private
parties seeking contribution for costs of the voluntary site cleanup.
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has an implicit shield against the threat of federal cleanup action suits. The
shield is based upon the principle of federal comity. The core of RCRA and
CERCLA is an accommodation between federal and state agencies, under which
they cooperate and integrate their enforcement resources. In a state with full
authority to implement the RCRA program, state agency approval of a site
cleanup minimizes or eliminates federal involvement.
Though the state covenant does not automatically prevent potential federal
actions, cleanup of a site makes federal action unlikely.8 A state covenant also
makes federal action unlikely because a site is documented to be enviro-
nmentally clean. Thus, already limited federal dollars are not needed for
cleanup suits involving state-approved sites. It is realistic to assume that federal
environmental officials will not target a site where a state supervised cleanup
was completed, checked, reported upon, and had achieved the governor's
covenant. With hundreds of sites on the pending list for possible action, no
reason exists for a federal agency to sue in order to further clean up a site
already inspected by public officials and deemed clean. Federal EPA Regional
Offices customarily work with and respect the judgment of state environmental
regulators. CERCLA would not be invoked to list the site on the National
Priority List89 since the remediation would be complete. Furthermore, RCRA
remedies would not be applied since state-supervised corrective action would
have been accomplished. 90
Indiana officials are pleased that federal environmental officials have given
a cautious and informal favorable review to the state's voluntary program.9
Because the federal agencies have traditionally enjoyed considerable pros-
ecutorial discretion to select enforcement targets,92 the best guarantee that the
covenant will forestall litigation is the mutual desire of federal and state
regulators to get sites back into normal use rapidly, and to use the limited
enforcement resources against those whose recalcitrance warrants enforcement
actions.
Under Indiana's program, no site that is subject to a pending federal or
state enforcement action can belatedly insist on performing a voluntary site
cleanup. Once the problem site is subjected to enforcement agency charges or
orders, it may be too late to ask for voluntary cleanups. 9 3 The state may, if
it chooses, declare ineligible any site that is already under a federal or state
remediation or pre-remediation action, or that is required to be subject to
88. Id.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (1988).
90. Id. §§ 6924(u), 6928(h).
91. Hawvermale, supra note 76. Their interest increased in light of several pending proposals to adopt
a federal equivalent to the Indiana voluntary program. Id.; see also S. 773, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
92. See Chaney v. Heckler, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that agency discretion to enforce is
unreviewable when court lacks meaningful standard for judging agency discretion).
93. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-10 (Bums Supp. 1993): see also Hawvermale, supra note 76.
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enforcement action. 94 The administrators of the voluntary program also will
reject sites that pose an imminent and substantial threat to human health or the
environment.95 These are high-priority health risk situations that really warrant
extensive government involvement. Public protection justifies a stronger
response for these sites, and the state agency can refuse to accept belated
private remedial efforts.
Other claims that fall outside the governor' covenant are common law
actions for past exposures. Although Indiana's law cannot prevent such
lawsuits, these suits for past conduct are not likely to be brought against a
redeveloper who has remediated the site. No common law cause of action
appears likely to achieve a faster or more complete remediation. Indiana's
statutory preclusion of private actions under waste statutes,96 and its delivery
of improved property conditions, greatly reduce the propensity for plaintiffs to
litigate over sites that have won the covenant from the governor. The result has
been described by Indiana Commissioner of Environmental Management Kathy
Prosser as "the ultimate win/win situation," allowing financial institutions,
community residents, environmental organizations and site owners to each
benefit from the agreements.97
2. Preliminary Mechanisms
Voluntary environmental cleanup projects must be addressed seriously by
developers, lending institutions, and the implementing government agencies.
The remedial costs can be significant and the public, especially the local
residents, will not tolerate a developer's claim of completed site cleanup that
cannot be documented and approved by public agencies. Indiana encourages
potential applicants to consider the program carefully with their consultants and
counsel before applying.9"
Under the program, a prospective applicant or its consultant begins by
gathering data about the site, its environmental condition, pollution releases,
and hazardous exposures.99 Frequently, a bank has already evaluated the
environmental conditions of a foreclosed property."° Prudent firms will
conduct an exhaustive study, thereby increasing the chances that their
94. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-10 (Bums Supp. 1993).
95. Id. § 13-7-8.9-10(a)(3).
96. Id. § 13-7-8.9-18(e).
97. Commissioner Kathy Prosser, Address at the Manufacturers Environmental Symposium (Mar. 11,
1993) [hereinafter Prosseri.
98. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
99. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-7 (Bums Supp. 1993).
100. Healy & Healy, supra note 51, at 396.
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applications will be accepted.'0 ' Since future critics may have incentives to
discover omissions from the coverage of the covenant, caution is warranted.0 2
The applicant then files a form application and pays a $1,000 fee to cover
initial costs.0 3 A staff member applies a checklist to ensure that the site is
eligible for consideration."° The Indiana Department of Environmental
Management then sends the applicant its initial eligibility determination. If the
applicant is found ineligible, the portion of the fee not consumed by staff efforts
is returned. This aspect of the application process-that the advocate of the
cleanup reimburses the costs incurred by the state agency in reviewing the
application-is essential for the health of this program.'
0 5
Only when the project meets eligibility criteria does the application begin
to receive closer attention. Eligible applicants are notified that they can submit
a work plan.' The statute requires that the site work plan include details of
the site's proposed remediation steps, schedules for the phases of remediation,
quality assurance, and community relations information. 10 7 Although this
multi-volume task is less formidable than some of the mandated RCRA tasks
for corrective actions,' a sound presentation will be worth the effort to make
the project well understood by state officials. The work plan is the heart of the
program for both parties. It explains what will be done, by whom, and when
cleanup will be completed. It shapes the issues that will be covered by a
covenant not to sue.'
0 9
The developer who wants to use the site has a strong incentive to put its
best efforts into presenting the work plan. The state has an interest in letting
the public know that the plans are sufficient to protect health and to restore a
sound environmental condition to the site. Moreover, because the community
has an interest in securing an environmentally safe neighbor that offers job
opportunities for its residents, the press and community representatives will
likely use the work plan to evaluate the adequacy of the state's supervision of
the project.
The Voluntary Remediation Agreements are designed to avoid and resolve
conflicts without an adversarial process. Creative use of dispute resolution tools
is a feature of the Voluntary Remediation Agreement."0 Schedules for
101. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
102. The exclusion of causes of action under the covenant not to sue does not extend to causes of
action that were not known to the state when the remedial program was reviewed and approved. IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-7-8.9-18 (Bums Supp. 1993).
103. Id. § 13-7-8.9-9.
104. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
105. Id.
106. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-12 (Burns Supp. 1993).
107. Id.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988).
109. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-18 (Burns Supp. 1993).
110. Id. § 13-7-8.9-13.
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submissions, coordination of activities, estimated costs, and a timetable for state
officials' actions are included in the Agreement.' Because the state is
reimbursed for the steps it must take, the program can be expected to have a
more cooperative and task-oriented approach than many other environmental
remediation order proceedings."' Unexpended portions of the private fees can
be refunded if the pre-agreement negotiations break down.
3. Incentives
Both regulator and developer have incentives to make the site cleanup
successful. Regulators will not want to risk embarrassment and news media
challenges by having their elected leader, the governor, sign a covenant that
forestalls future enforcement actions against a company whose continued site
problems should have been detected and halted. The private entity has an
incentive to complete the negotiations because the data presented to the state
could make the site vulnerable to mandatory cleanup orders in the future. If the
negotiations fail, the site may be assigned to a state environmental compliance
officer who would consider whether to initiate an enforcement action. Although
the state wants to make this program a model of its successful flexibility in
environmental cleanup, if the terms of the agreement are not kept by the
developer, the state retains all its regulatory options under current law. The
community's incentive is once again to have a safe and active employer.
Residents near a dormant industrial site may fear any revival of activity
and potential pollution from the site. 1 3 Prior to any binding decision, the
Indiana Department of Environmental Management gives notice to neighboring
residents about a proposed plan and accepts comments. The cleanup work plan
contains sufficient detail for residents to determine the advantages and
disadvantages to their community. If the state proposes to accept a particular
site's remediation plan, strong community opinion-pro and con-can be
voiced at a hearing following a 30-day public notice period."
14
Hazardous waste cleanup projects are usually controversial. In a site
redevelopment situation, the prospective developer's community relations
function is primarily educational. The owner must describe the site cleanup to
neighbors and explain why the remedial plan is faster and less costly than a
future mandatory cleanup. Furthermore, the new owner bears the burden of
explaining that the benefits under its plan might include attracting new business
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The case law documents numerous instances where adverse effects were discovered only after
the polluter's departure, leaving residents with little more than a long-shot toxic torts lawsuit. Although
available, such suits are costly to develop and rarely successful. See generally TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE
GUIDE (James T. O'Reilly ed., 1992).
114. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-.9-15 (Burns Supp. 1993).
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and new local tax revenue. An astute developer will also recruit support among
the facility's former workers who may seek new employment at the site after
its cleanup and rehabilitation.
4. Costs
Costs of the cleanup are not borne by taxpayers. An important aspect of
the Indiana plan is that any costs to the state are reimbursed by those who hope
to profit from the site, usually the industrial site owner or developer. 15 A fee
of $1,000 is paid at the start of the process, but according to state officials, the
fee has not been a deterrent to the early filings."6 Both large and small sites,
from steel mills to gas stations, are eligible to apply, so the smaller town bank
and its few parcels of former industrial or commercial sites can use the program
with relatively small entry costs. 7
While remediation as a process remains expensive, the governmental
oversight costs charged by Indiana officials under that state's new program' 18
are likely to be a small fraction of the costs that a bank or developer would
incur if it were to defend a judicial or civil administrative action for a mandated
cleanup." 9 The Indiana voluntary cleanup agreement is a one-to-one
transaction between a state agency and the private developer, reducing the
excessive transaction costs for which multi-party Superfund site cleanups have
become famous. 2 ° The voluntary action also follows a model of simplicity,
thus eliminating the multiple levels of approval that have inhibited progress on
many large site environmental cleanup projects. 2' To the extent that cost is
important, as it invariably is for a manufacturing entrepreneur, the voluntary
system is preferable to a mandatory and more bureaucratic system.
115. Id. §§ 13-7-8.9-13(a)(l)(B), 13-7-8.9-21(e)(1). These provisions provide for recoupment of every
cost of the state officials who review the application and oversee the cleanup. See also Hawvermale, supra
note 76.
116. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
117. Those larger sites with long-standing pollution problems are likely to have been already subjected
to mandatory cleanup orders. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988).
118. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-21(d)(1) (Bums Supp. 1993).
119. The legal and administrative overhead costs of CERCLA are so high that economists studying
the program doubt its effectiveness. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS
77 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds., 1992).
120. The fact that legal fees are greater, by about ten percent, than cleanup costs has been a source
of real alarm for companies affected by CERCLA. Marianne Lavelle, Environment Vise: Law, Compliance,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at S8.
121. MAYS, supra note 33, § 5.19.
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5. Post-Approval Mechanisms
Once the plan is approved, a state agency manager or technical contractor
hired by the state will supervise the corrective action. 22 All federal and state
requirements for the actual cleanup must be satisfied and documented to the
state's satisfaction. The state will employ the same cleanup standards for both
voluntary and mandatory cleanup programs, so that public protection is
unaffected.
At this stage, the voluntary program sometimes exceeds the anticipated
costs. The community outreach can be particularly expensive. Nevertheless,
total costs under a voluntary cleanup are still less than those of a mandated
RCRA corrective action program. In addition, while the corrective action's
might be slow, progress under the voluntary agreement will avoid the delays
implicated in adversarial proceeding.
12 3
The end products of the cleanup will be a site ready for employment and
two documents. A certificate of completion will be recorded with the deed to
the property, so that future lenders or buyers have the benefit of the state's
decision.'2 Second, the governor will sign a covenant not to sue for any
liability that results from the disclosures that formed the basis of the
agreement.125 The governor's document binds the state and provides a
valuable assurance to the property owner, who can then proceed with the
development and bear no more than the normal commercial risks of business
development activity at the site.
126
C. Preliminary Impressions, Preliminary Results
In the summer of 1993, state environmental officials unveiled the new
voluntary program at public meetings held all over Indiana. The press was very
supportive because of the plan's potential impact on the local economy.
127
State officials received more than two hundred inquiries and six site proposals
in the three months following the unveiling. 128 Although state officials
expected the first proposals to be simple remedial projects, three of the earliest
122. Id.
123. Delay has been endemic in the corrective action system for waste site remediation. See STEINBERG
& WIENER, supra note 31, § 2,22.
124. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-17 (Burns Supp. 1993).
125. Id. § 13-7-8.9-18.
126. As previously discussed, the state's covenant will preclude actions under state law, and serve as
an implicit shield against suits by federal environmental officials for site cleanup. See supra text
accompanying notes 85-97.
127. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
128. Id.
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projects involved groundwater contaminant cleanup, one of the most challenging
environmental remedies.
29
Because an Indiana site's voluntary remediation results in reopening or
redevelopment of a site, financial institutions will be more willing to provide
capital for projects on the rehabilitated site.130 In addition, community
involvement in the process may reduce local hostility toward the new operator
of the site, and improve relations between the old site operator and government
cleanup agencies. Even without these psychological benefits, the news media
can at least report a break in the gridlock of environmental cleanups in that
area. That in itself is newsworthy.
The real test of the program, however, will come when an urban factory
is selected for the program and the voluntary remediation agreement clears the
hurdles of a public hearing and agency acceptance, and results in true cleanup.
The reopened factory should possess a competitive advantage over its rivals
because of the benefits of location, a skilled work force, and an in-place
infrastructure for transportation and services. So long as comparable cleanup
standards are applied, developers can also rely on the support of local
environmental organizations.
D. Inherent Precautions
Despite the obvious positive results of the program, we must keep in mind
that these results are tentative. Indiana's model of voluntary remediation is still
too new for us to identify its potential shortcomings; however, they appear to
be few. First, a regulatory definition of how much remediation makes a site
clean is necessary.' 3' Second, the health effects of any new use for the site
should be considered during remedial planning.' Third, a thorough check
of an applicant must be conducted in order to avoid embarrassing mistakes
when choosing a developer. Moreover, additional staff will need to be hired
in order to process applications before the cash flow from applicant-paid fees
is large enough to make the program self-sustaining; a short-term resource drain
will occur. Finally, the education and outreach employees of the environmental
agency will have to work harder to dispel myths about the program and to
facilitate meetings to introduce the particular work plan.
129. Id.
130. Results from a 1990 survey of lenders suggest this covenant would greatly facilitate the lending
decision. Healy & Healy, supra note 51, at 397-98.
131. An excellent recap of the "how clean is clean" debate is found in PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note
8, at 373-77 (explaining 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) and 40 C.F.R. § 300.430).
132. The federal experience suggests this approach. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) (1988). Ultimately, as
in any voluntary program, the credibility of the cleanup will be tested by whether the community
representatives accept the proposed standard of cleanup as sufficient to protect the health of the site's
neighbors.
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Community relations specialists will be an important part of the team in
any state that adopts such a program. As public officials with a public
constituency, they will need to keep local resident groups aware of the process
and encourage comments on the work plan. Because manufacturing jobs are
a major goal of this program, state labor officials will also have to work hard
to assure the public that the necessary job training programs and school
vocational educational courses will be tailored to the needs of the new
entrepreneurs.
This ambitious Indiana program might not generate the expected changes,
or the recessionary economic climate might force developers to increase the
delay between cleanup and job commencement. The state officials responsible
are aware that their efforts will be overseen and measured by their results. 33
If the Indiana program fails, and many dormant sites are not remediated, or
worse, sites are remediated but not reused, the program might be viewed as a
failed experiment in the use of environmental cooperation rather than
confrontation. Should that occur, the net costs to society will be no different
than present costs: taxes not earned by local government, career and family
benefits not received by potential site workers, and the continuing financial and
environmental costs of maintaining and later remediating the site.
34
E. Necessary Refinements
Indiana's system promotes voluntary remediation agreements and avoids
the mandate-bound swamps of existing federal programs, and it should serve
as a model worth serious consideration by the other forty-nine states. States
considering the Indiana program, however, should also consider several
potential modifications to the Indiana model. State covenants are not capable
of awarding total freedom from allegations of harm. Since common law tort
remedies are still available despite the pre-emption of state statutory
actions, 3 ' statutory protection of the new site developer may need to be
expanded. The Indiana statute cuts off the citizen suit option under state
law, 36 but additional clarity would be helpful. Citizens and citizen groups
could be convinced that preventing tort suits is in their interest, as the state
voluntary agreement plan will hold the promise of a quick cleanup. Nuisance
and other common law actions for site challenges can still be brought against
those responsible for past releases, but these have less likelihood of success
because of the corrective measures that have been taken at the site.
133. Hawvermale. supra note 76.
134. The voluntary program's reimbursement feature protects the state from incurring costs for its part
of the operation. See supra text accompanying notes 115-21. Overall, the private sector developer and the
lending institution have many incentives to avoid that failure and to make the Indiana system succeed.
135. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.9-18 (Burns Supp. 1993).
136. Id. § 13-7-8.9-17.
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The federal government should also tinker with its system so as to
encourage Indiana-like programs. Federal legislation might be adopted to
exclude suits against certain voluntarily remediated sites under federal RCRA
and CERCLA.'37 Though the EPA's cooperation with states is imperfect and
needs improvement, 13 during the early days of the Indiana program, regional
EPA officials were cautiously supportive. 139 Post-covenant citizen suits under
federal law could be precluded by statutory changes at the federal level. Even
without changes, a covenant may satisfy the statutory conditions under which
such private citizen suits are precluded.'o
Ill. Refinements, Future Improvements, and External Necessities
While Indiana's program is an excellent response to the needs of site
owners who are capable and willing to recapture property values for specific
parcels, more is needed to stimulate job creation and overcome the obstacles
to urban employment. There must first be initiatives that change the traditional
way that regulators deal with those they regulate, as well as their colleagues.
Moreover, rust belt states with inner-city industrial areas larger than Indiana's
can encourage voluntary site salvagers to develop manufacturing employment
opportunities through the adoption of Indiana-like programs. For instance, states
will need to go much further by providing subsidies for redevelopment efforts.
Some states may need to be a lender of last resort when cleaned sites cannot
attract sufficient capital. These states can use Indiana's model, coupled with
state redevelopment seed money grants for evaluation of the site, to give
developers an extra incentive to start working on applications for voluntary
remediation agreements.
A. Potential Regulatory Initiatives
1. Bank Regulators
The bank regulatory regime"' has been virtually untouched by the public
clamor for environmental remediation. Making a loan for environmentally
vulnerable properties is risky.' In the face of tighter loan portfolio exam-
137. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
138. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
THE NATION'S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS (1990).
139. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
141. The loan practices of federally regulated institutions are subject to audits by federal officiaLs. See
12 C.F.R. §§ 3, 227 (1993).
142. Healy & Healy, supra'note 51, at 396-97.
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ination, such a loan might place a bank officer's career at risk. 43 No
incentive exists for lenders to risk federal overseers' wrath and alter their
informal, greenlining policy described earlier in this Article.1"
State and federal financial regulators need reassurance about environmental
costs, as well as other encouragement, in order for them to loosen those lending
restrictions which prevent recycling of industrial sites and loans for infill
construction around existing plant sites. Bank regulators are particularly
sensitive to loans that become non-producing because of environmental bad
news.145 Assuaging this fear must be a new role for environmental agencies.
Moreover, bank regulators must be made to see that their fears will have a
significant long-term impact on levels .of investment in the inner city.
Thus, as a first step, bank regulators need to be informed of the impact
of environmental regulation on their own practices. Environmental regulators
should meet with their bank regulator counterparts and outline new legislative
initiatives, like the Indiana program, that can facilitate site salvage while
reducing the specter of lender liability. Environmental agencies and
nongovernmental organizations must also emphasize that freeing up capital for
such projects has not only obvious environmental benefits, but can provide
social and economic stability for the affected inner-city communities.
2. Environmental Regulators
Public sector employees within environmental agencies are experienced
at saying "no" and have no incentive to do otherwise. The RCRA and
CERCLA systems"' impose on regulators many disincentives to acquiring
the enlightened attitude that voluntary remediation will need to succeed.
Congress writes laws with such majesty and inscrutability that the recipient,
a state or regional EPA employee of perhaps three years' experience, is vested
with tremendous discretionary power. In hearing after hearing, congressional
and state legislative committees have "exposed," "denounced," "revealed," and
otherwise degraded the errors by regulators.'4 7 Thus, environmental agency
employees can be forgiven for keeping their heads down, going through the
motions, and safely saying "no." A permit writer, site coordinator, or case
manager does not advance her career by taking up the cause of creating jobs.
Environmental regulators, who are often underpaid and underappreciated,
may need incentives to make such a private site-salvage system work. First,
143. See Turning Green, supra note 53, at 84 (describing lender fear of liability for pollution).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
145. Melamed, supra note 5, at 9.
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992, 9601-9675 (1988).
147. Political oversight of chemical engineering decisions on the detailed listings of hazardous
chemicals is an occupational hazard for the expert administrative agencies. See, e.g., Metam Sodium Should
be Listed as Hazardous, Rep. Boxer Says, PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL NEWS, Aug. 7, 1991, at 6.
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a program champion within the agency, to encourage and shepherd a qualified
applicant through the program, should be appointed. Second, state regulatory
agencies should give incentives to their employees who participate con-
structively in industrial site salvage. Managers who score their employees on
the number of penalty cases filed or the difficulty of pre-licensing questions
asked should reward employees to produce creative outcomes at inner-city sites.
There is a need for cooperative, voluntary, and results-oriented programs like
the Indiana voluntary remediation program. Positive feelings about a program
that creates instead of destroys can be very helpful to morale within a state
agency.
The incentives to be offered to individual employees are not new money
or instant promotions for the employee who approves an applicant's work plan.
The incentives should include praise for creativity, support for not being
obstinately rigid, applause for getting a negotiated cleanup at modest cost, and
promotion without having to display scalps of wounded regulated companies.
Recognition works wonders at the individual level, without much expense. A
covenant-signing ceremony in the governor's office, at which the state's team
is praised for work well done, may be all that it takes. A little press attention
would help; the novelty of the press praising the bureaucracy for caring enough
to help create private sector manufacturing jobs would be truly gratifying.
B. Legislative Action
More substantive measures, however, are needed. The federal government
and the states need. to do more than merely encourage their employees to
promote redevelopment of environmentally hazardous sites. States that want
to build upon the Indiana law, as well as the federal government, should debate
the voluntary remediation program and the tiers of potential fiscal assistance
at the same time. Coordinated funding, loan guarantees, and development
assistance already exist for most states to launch new industrial sites. The state
enabling legislation for this program should link the remediation program, the
covenant not to sue, and the development and tax incentive packages to
maximize the inducement for developers to create new inner-city employment
opportunities.
Legislators must actively create interest in these sites among prospective
developers in several ways. First, seed money grants for serious applicants
should be made available. Second, a tax incentive, comparable to that formerly
available for historic redevelopment, might be made available for properties that
achieve cleanup and comply with site covenants. Third, costs of site reme-
diation by a company that has been accepted into the program, when work is
done in a good faith effort to obtain a covenant, might receive special short-
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term tax credits from state government. Finally, future federal amortization
benefits for the writeoff of these expenses could be an incentive.
Developers, though, will still require capital from commercial lending
institutions for their projects. Consequently, any package of reform must also
include incentives for financial institutions to invest in these projects. 4 An
express statutory incentive in federal banking reform legislation, perhaps in the
form of special corporate tax recognition of the gains received on environmental
loan portfolios, would help. Another express incentive for providing loans to
the covenant-covered properties could involve direct state subsidies for banks
that make targeted loans. One indirect, but no less effective, incentive could
be to have state treasurers limit the depository institutions that receive the
state's business to those that actively finance industrial site salvage projects.
C. Neighborhood Group Action
Action to promote private sector jobs can build from the same experiences.
Inner-city America could benefit from more loans, more accessible jobs, and
a profitable manufacturing base. These nontraditional policy objectives for
social advocacy organizations could be achieved with the same amount of
lobbying effort by the same activist lobbying groups. The skill of these
organizations in obtaining legislative support could very well be used in support
of voluntary industrial site remediation. I49 Their skepticism toward devel-
opers' intentions could be assuaged by the public hearings on the detailed site
work plan,' 50 and by the political sensitivity officials to avoid embarrassing
the governor with a covenant that did not reflect the actual conditions of the
site.
Not all sites will attract immediate attention, of course. Some sites will
lack a champion, a persistent, environmentally astute developer with the vision
of profitable remediation and the ability to start-up or lease to new
manufacturing ventures. For sites in need of a push, neighborhood development
corporations could become the developer, using state development department
field offices as their shepherds. A state development department that becomes
the interface with state environmental officials could do much of the
preliminary work to attract site developers, who in turn will carry through
148. It is ironic that environmental action groups have ignored the connection between lending
practices and domestic environmental matters. Several U.S. environmental organizations actively lobby the
World Bank, a multinational economic institution, to place environmental quality concerns into each World
Bank consideration of a developing nation loan. This pressure has received enhanced attention from the
World Bank. See, e.g., JAMES A. LEE, THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND HUMAN ECOLOGY:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1985).
149. The groups actively participated in shaping the Indiana legislation as part of a state-sponsored
discussion group. Hawvermale, supra note 76.
150. IND. CODE ANN. 13-7-8.9-15 (Bums Supp. 1993).
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projects to the stage at which an employer can move in and create jobs. Tax
incentives and consortium-building incentives can be implemented as well.
D. Current Federal Developments
1. Executive
The Clinton Administration is currently considering adverse environmental
effects on poor communities. A small effort to encourage the remediation of
industrial sites may come from a draft Executive Order on environmental
justice.15' Under this Executive Order, agencies that make decisions under
any enabling statute must take into account the adverse environmental effects
of their decisions upon "minority and low income communities.' ' 2 These
adverse impacts must be explained and fully considered as the agency moves
forward.
One goal of the Executive Order is to reduce traditional environmental
racism: the siting of new waste emitting facilities in locations that dis-
proportionately harm the health of minority and low income persons. Another
goal, however, is precisely that which has been addressed in this Article:
removing barriers that keep out of poor communities those job opportunities
that an environmentally sound, clean site can bring. The order requires federal
agencies to analyze the impact of their credit, development funding, and lending
decisions that affect redevelopment of inner-city employment.'53 Such pro-
grammatic changes in the way that agencies apply their efforts to the inner city
will complement the voluntary remediation agreements that achieve a related
goal within the same neighborhood.
2. Legislative
Several bills proposed in the 103rd Congress would ameliorate envi-
ronmental racism in siting and cleanup decisions through the use of impact
statements and agency planning.'54 The concept of avoiding adverse health
impact through legislative direction of siting and, through, by the mitigation
provisions in the Executive Order, is laudable.
151. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994); Federal Agencies Would Have to Address
Environmental Equity Under Draft Order, 24 Env't. Rep (BNA) 620 (Aug. 13, 1993).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. An overview of these bills is given in Ronald Begley & Elisabeth Kirschner, The Demand for
Environmental Justice, CHEMICAL WK., Sept. 15, 1993, at 27.
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Voluntary site remediation programs have also been the subject of a
recently proposed bill in Congress.' 55 The states would be provided with
federal funds to oversee voluntary programs similar to the one in Indiana.
Under these bills, the federal government would become a lender of low-interest
loans, subsidizing voluntary cleanup and redevelopment programs of local
entities.
In this era of budgetary austerity, however, Congress is less likely to enact
these bills than the reporting and planning requirements of environmental equity
legislation. Funds for domestic discretionary programs such as urban renewal
are not as readily available as they were in the past. Even if the loan programs
were adopted, the available funding is likely to be rapidly depleted, as sites now
untouched and unacceptable to private lenders are salvaged with federal funds.
The federal interest in urban industrial job creation supports the argument that
both sites and employment patterns of the past could be restored to productive
use.
Conclusion
A drive through inner-city neighborhoods, so close to downtown and so
close to urban university campuses, may spur a wishful fantasy that large
financial institutions would willingly volunteer to salvage the abandoned
factories along the route and recycle them into job-creating entrepreneurial
havens. But wishing will not make this happen. Without a remediation program,
these sites will remain only potential job opportunities and potential sources
of vital local tax revenue.
Environmental cleanup uncertainties have choked off inner-city industrial
redevelopment by taking away the essential financing without which investors
and entrepreneurs cannot hope to succeed. Certificates of environmental cleanup
and covenants not to sue have the potential to break this urban gridlock.
Regulators do not lightly give such precious documents. The Indiana program,
built on experiences in other states, has the potential to revitalize inner-city
properties, while still fulfilling the public's demand for a cleaner environment.
There are many reasons for an apathetic status quo. By attempting change,
banks risk losing money, environmentalists risk looking like allies of their
frequent opponents in the real estate development field, and regulators appear
to be softer than necessary when dealing with the past mistakes of
manufacturers. Paradigm shifts are not easy.
Perhaps the new Indiana paradigm of voluntary cleanup will bring cities
like Gary, Terre Haute, and Indianapolis enough certifiably clean startup
155.' S. 773, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); see also Legislation to Clean Up Low Priority Sites,
Stimulate Economy, Praised by Diverse Groups, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 345 (June 25, 1993).
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manufacturing sites that loans will again flow to entrepreneurs. If that occurs,
and jobs follow, the streetcorner despair of the inner city might be replaced by
streetcomer industrial workshops and infill construction of small factories,
employing inner-city residents and encouraging their participation in the private
sector. That, in the words of Commissioner Prosser of Indiana, would be "the
ultimate win/win situation."' 56
156. Prosser, supra note 97.

